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I. INTRODUCTION 
Stored value cards (―SVCs‖ or ―prepaid cards‖) allow users to access 
prefunded value (either stored on the card itself or in a remote database)
1
 
through an embedded chip, a magnetic stripe, or simply an access number 
and password.
2
  Though SVCs can be used in a variety of contexts, they 
can be divided into two basic types:  ―closed loop‖ and ―open loop‖ cards.
3
  
Generally, closed loop cards can only be used for a single function or at a 
single merchant (or group of merchants).
4
  Examples include subway fare 
cards and retail gift cards.  Open loop cards, such as those branded by Visa 
and MasterCard, are processed through existing payment card networks 
and can be used to withdraw cash at any network-accessible automated 
teller machine (―ATM‖) or at any merchant that accepts credit or debit 
cards for point-of-sale transactions.
5
 
Given this flexibility, the market for prepaid cards has expanded 
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 1. A Summary of the Roundtable Discussion on Stored-Value Cards and Other 
Prepaid Products, FED. RESERVE BD., 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/storedvalue/default.htm (last updated Jan. 
12, 2005).  The Federal Reserve Board distinguishes stored-value cards (where value is 
stored on the card itself) from prepaid cards (where value is stored in a remote database).  
Id.  This distinction is not important for purposes of this Comment. 
 2. U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY ET AL., 2007 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING 
STRATEGY 39 (2007), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/nmls.pdf 
[hereinafter NAT‘L MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY]. 
 3. The Many Uses of Stored-Value Cards, AT YOUR SERVICE (Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Kan. City, Kan. City, Mo.) Fall 2003, at 2. 
 4. NAT‘L MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 39. 
 5. Id. 
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rapidly.  The global open loop market, which was worth $12.8 billion in 
2004,
6
 is expected to grow to as much as $680 billion by 2015,
7
 with 
additional billions likely to be spent in closed loop transactions.  Because 
SVCs can be used to gain access to the mainstream payments system 
without a traditional checking or credit account, card companies have been 
particularly aggressive in marketing SVCs to immigrants, the unbanked, 
and those with poor credit.
8
 
These same features have made SVCs attractive to money launderers 
and terrorist financiers.  While consumer protection advocates have 
criticized prepaid cards as ―an expensive way to spend your own money,‖
9
 
the various fees imposed by card providers are a small price to pay for a 
money launderer seeking ―a compact, easily transportable, and potentially 
anonymous way to store and access cash value.‖
10
  Indeed, SVCs are 
appealing to money launderers for a host of reasons.  First, just about any 
type of prepaid card—open or closed loop—is susceptible to some form of 
money laundering scheme.
11




Second, because SVCs are designed to operate outside of a traditional 
banking relationship, money launderers can easily obtain and reload 
prepaid cards anonymously.
13
  This is especially true due to the wide 
availability of SVCs on the Internet and through lightly regulated third-
party vendors like convenience stores.
14
 
Third, money launderers can use prepaid cards to approximate 
international wire transfers without the aid of a traditional bank or money 
transmitter.
15
  While any open loop card with ATM access can be used to 
send remittances (by loading funds on to the card and dropping it in the 
mail), many cards are specially designed to facilitate remittances.
16
  Some 
 
 6. U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., PREPAID STORED VALUE 
CARDS: A POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE TO TRADITIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING METHODS 6 
(2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs11/20777/20777p.pdf [hereinafter 
NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR. REPORT]. 
 7. Maria Aspen, Can Prepaid Bridge Debit Divide for MasterCard?, AMERICAN 
BANKER, May 28, 2009. 
 8. NAT‘L MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 39; Stored Value Cards: An 
Alternative for the Unbanked?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. (July 2004), 
http://www.ny.frb.org/regional/stored_value_cards.html. 
 9. Press Release, Fin. Consumer Agency of Can., FCAC Launches Pre-Paid Payment 
Card Guide (Oct. 19, 2006), available at http://www.fcac-
acfc.gc.ca/eng/media/news/default.asp?postingId=225. 
 10. NAT‘L MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 39. 
 11. Id. at 42. 
 12. Id. 
 13. NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR. REPORT, supra note 6, at 4. 
 14. NAT‘L MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 40. 
 15. NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR. REPORT, supra note 6, at 4. 
 16. Prepaid Cards an Emerging Threat, CORNERSTONE REPORT (U.S. Immigration & 
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cards are even sold in pairs so that a party can deposit cash in an ATM in 




Fourth, prepaid cards can serve to dramatically lower barriers to 
accessing the U.S. financial system.
18
  For instance, certain offshore banks 
allow buyers to obtain and load SVCs with unlimited value anonymously, 
which enables buyers to use the SVCs to make cash withdrawals at 
domestic ATMs and thereby skirt numerous reporting requirements 
mandated by federal law.
19
 
Finally, the existing anti-money laundering (―AML‖) laws and 
regulations in the United States are insufficient to contain this emerging 
threat.  There are two main problems with the current AML regime as it 
relates to SVCs.  First, prepaid cards are not considered ―monetary 
instruments‖ for purposes of the Currency and Monetary Instrument 
Reporting (―CMIR‖) requirement,
20
 a provision of the Bank Secrecy Act 
(―BSA‖)
21
 that imposes a reporting requirement on any person transporting 
monetary instruments with aggregate value of over $10,000 into or out of 
the U.S.
22
  This means that the two criminal statutes used to enforce the 
CMIR requirement
23
 cannot be applied to unreported or smuggled SVCs, 
even if the aggregate value of the cards is much higher than $10,000.
24
  The 
result is an easily exploitable loophole whereby ill-intentioned individuals 
can legally move large amounts of money into and out of the U.S.  This 
loophole is especially consequential because prepaid cards are already 
inherently less conspicuous to transport or ship than bulk cash.
25
 
The second major flaw in the current U.S. AML regime as it relates to 
SVCs is that sellers of prepaid cards, though defined as ―money services 
businesses‖ (―MSBs‖) under the BSA, are not required to register with the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (―FinCEN‖),
26
 are not required to 
 
Customs Enforcement, D.C.), Dec. 2006, at 4, available at 
http://149.101.23.4/doclib/news/library/reports/cornerstone/cornerstone3-2.pdf. 
 17. NAT‘L MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 40. 
 18. See id. (describing money laundering vulnerabilities presented by prepaid cards). 
 19. NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR. REPORT, supra note 6, at 5. 
 20. 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (2006); see 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(3) (2006) (defining ―monetary 
instruments‖). 
 21. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Titles I and II of Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-1124 
(1970) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1829(b), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-59, & 31 U.S.C. §§ 
5311-32). 
 22. Courtney J. Linn, Regulating the Cross-Border Movement of Prepaid Cards, 11 J. 
MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 146, 151 (2008). 
 23. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c) (2006) (criminalizing CMIR reporting violations); 31 
U.S.C. § 5332 (2006) (criminalizing smuggling of monetary instruments). 
 24. NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR. REPORT, supra note 6, at 3. 
 25. See id. (noting that SVCs occupy less physical space than cash). 
 26. FinCEN is the bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury charged with 
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retain any form of customer identification or transaction records, and are 
not required to file Suspicious Activity Reports (―SARs‖).
27
  In fact, the 
only federal reporting requirement currently applicable to SVC providers is 
the filing of Currency Transaction Reports (―CTRs‖), which must be 
completed for all cash transactions over $10,000.
28
  Significantly, the 
subset of MSBs classified as ―money transmitters‖—which does not 
include SVC providers—must comply with all of the above requirements.
29
  
This loophole effectively eliminates the ―paper trail‖ that is so crucial for 
law enforcement efforts directed at combating money laundering and other 
financial crimes involving prepaid cards.
30
 
Given the regulatory passivity to date, it has become increasingly clear 
that Congress will need to take direct corrective action to eliminate these 
loopholes.  In May of 2009, Congress had the opportunity to do just that 
when Senator Susan Collins introduced an amendment, S.A. 1107,
31
 to 
legislation that eventually became the Credit Card Accountability 
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (―Credit CARD Act‖ or 
―Act‖).
32
  As proposed, S.A. 1107 would have directly addressed the two 
problems noted above:  not only would SVCs have been defined as 
monetary instruments, but providers of prepaid cards would have been 
defined as money transmitters.
33
  Thus, had S.A. 1107 been enacted as 
proposed, transporters of prepaid cards with an aggregate value of over 
$10,000 would have been obligated to file CMIR reports, and SVC vendors 
would have been required to verify, record, and retain customer 




However, S.A. 1107 was not enacted as proposed.  One day after 
Senator Collins proposed the amendment, Senator Richard Shelby offered a 
modified version of S.A. 1107 with strikingly different language.
35
  Instead 
 
administering the Bank Secrecy Act.  FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK 
SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL 4 (2006) [hereinafter 
FFIEC BSA/AML EXAMINATION MANUAL]. 
 27. NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR. REPORT, supra note 6, at 4. 
 28. Id. at 3. 
 29. Id. at 4. 
 30. See infra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of a paper 
trail). 
 31. 155 CONG. REC. S5426-27 (daily ed. May 13, 2009) (statement of Sen. Collins). 
 32. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009). 
 33. See 155 CONG. REC. S5415 at 5426 (modifying language of the Credit CARD Act, 
which would have directly modified the language of the BSA). 
 34. See NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR. REPORT, supra note 6, at 4 (discussing 
obligations of a subset of MSBs that are presently classified as money transmitters). 
 35. See 155 CONG. REC. S5471 (daily ed. May 14, 2009) (statement of Sen. Shelby) 
(modifying language of original S.A. 1107). 
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of directly amending the United States Code to include the relevant 
language about prepaid cards, the new version of the amendment directed 
the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations related to SVCs within 
270 days, and noted that the Secretary ―may‖ wish to include CMIR 
reporting requirements as part of such regulations.
36
  The Senate 
unanimously accepted the amended amendment, which eventually became 
Section 503 of the Credit CARD Act signed into law by President Obama.
37
  
Senator Collins issued a press release trumpeting the inclusion of the 
amended amendment as a victory in the fight against drug cartels.
38
 
Perhaps Senator Collins is right.  However, given the relatively weak 
language in Section 503, the amended amendment may have actually done 
more harm than good by forestalling meaningful action while at the same 
time providing political cover to opponents of reform.  Although the 
Department of the Treasury is required to promulgate some kind of 
regulations related to SVCs,
39
 it need not enact anything in particular, and 
thus the existing loopholes could remain open.
40
  This situation is 
unacceptable, especially because the introduction of S.A. 1107 was not the 
first time Congress proposed—but failed—to address these issues.
41
  
Congress should cease its equivocation and confront the flaws in the 
current AML regime head-on by immediately amending Section 503 with 
the language from the original S.A. 1107. 
The remainder of this Comment will discuss these issues in greater 
detail.  Part II will examine the origins of SVCs, how they operate, and 
how they are used.  Part III will describe the basic processes of laundering 
money and financing terrorism, and how SVCs may be used in those 
processes.  Part IV will discuss the specific money laundering threat from 
different types of SVCs.  Part V will examine the shortcomings of the 
current U.S. enforcement regime for AML and the prevention of terrorist 
financing as it relates to SVCs.  Part VI will set forth the arguments others 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-24, 123 Stat. 1734, § 503 (2009). 
 38. Press Release, Senator Susan Collins, Senate Approves Collins Amendment 
Restricting Flow of Drug Cartel Money (May 19, 2009), available at 2009 WLNR 9538049; 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Press.MinorityNews&ContentRecord 
(select ―May" and "2009 (85)‖ from dropdown menus; then follow hyperlink associated 
with ―05/19/09‖). 
 39. Interestingly, the Department of the Treasury has apparently already missed the 
prescribed deadline for developing these regulations:  270 days after May 22, 2009 (the date 
on which the Act was signed into law) was February 16, 2010. 
 40. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 § 503 
(including no specific requirements for regulations). 
 41. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control Act of 2007, H.R. 3156, 110th Cong. § 338 (2007) 
(proposing to close CMIR loophole); S. 1860, Violent Crime Control Act of 2007, 110th 
Cong. § 338 (2007) (proposing to close CMIR loophole). 
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have raised against closing these loopholes, including both practical and 
legal objections, and then analyze and answer these counterarguments.  
Part VII will conclude this Comment by arguing that notwithstanding the 
issues discussed in Part VI, the money laundering threat from SVCs must 
be addressed and the best place to begin is by closing the loopholes in the 
current AML regime via a Congressional amendment to the amended 
amendment. 
II. THE ORIGINS, OPERATION, AND USES OF STORED VALUE CARDS 
Prepaid cards are not a new phenomenon.  The first SVCs were 
developed in the 1970s by an Italian vending machine company frustrated 
by thefts of metal coins from its machines,
42
 and were subsequently used in 
transit systems and on college campuses.
43
  In the 1980s, the first prepaid 
phone cards emerged in the United States.
44
  Then, in 1994, the luxury 
retailer Neiman Marcus introduced the first stored value gift card, and the 
first bank-issued prepaid cards came into use in 1996.
45
  These closed loop 
cards were soon followed by open loop cards, first introduced by 
government agencies as a replacement for paper-based food stamps
46
 and 
long-haul trucking companies looking for a convenient payroll solution for 
their itinerant drivers (who often lacked personal bank accounts).
47
  
Network branded open loop SVCs came next, and by 2008 there were 
seven million Visa or MasterCard branded prepaid cards in circulation.
48
  
Industry experts expect the prepaid market to continue to grow rapidly, 
with some analysts predicting that certain prepaid products will experience 
more than 100% growth per year.
49
 
Network branded prepaid cards function in a manner similar to 
traditional debit cards.  First, the cardholder swipes his card through a 
point-of-sale or electronic data capture terminal at a retail store or ATM.
50
  
The terminal reads the sixteen-digit number encoded in the card‘s magnetic 
stripe, which serves to identify the card and the issuing bank.
51
  The 
 
 42. John T. Albers, Note, Stored Value Cards: Should We Know the Holder?, 11 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 363, 367 (2007). 
 43. Kathleen L. DiSanto, Down the Rabbit Hole: An Adventure in the Wonderland of 
Stored-Value Card Regulation, 12 J. CONSUMER & COMMERCIAL L. 22, 23 (2008). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 23 n.6. 
 46. Id. at 23. 
 47. Albers, supra note 42, at 369. 
 48. Id. 
 49. NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARD ASS‘N, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT 
NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARDS 2 (2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter NBPCA, 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS]. 
 50. Linn, supra note 22, at 151. 
 51. Id. 
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terminal then transmits this information to the third-party processor of the 
beneficiary bank, which in turn queries the third-party processor of the 
issuing bank regarding whether the card is valid and whether the funds 
associated with the card are sufficient to carry out the transaction.
52
  If the 
card is valid and there are sufficient funds, the issuing bank responds with 
an electronic ―OK‖ and places a hold on the funds, which are generally 
held in a pooled account at the issuing bank.
53
  When the transaction is later 
settled, the issuing bank reduces the available balance associated with the 
card by the purchase or withdrawal amount.
54
  During this process, the only 
information actually transmitted to the merchant terminal is the approval or 
denial of the transaction.
55
 
Because SVCs offer an alternative means of accessing the existing 
payments system infrastructure, it is not surprising that consumers, 
businesses, and governments have embraced these products with great 
enthusiasm.  Consumers can use prepaid cards in place of traveler‘s checks 
and gift certificates, to send remittances to family members abroad, and as 
educational tools to teach teenagers how to manage money and use credit 
cards responsibly.
56
  Those consumers who distrust or lack access to the 
traditional banking system or have poor credit can use prepaid cards in 
place of traditional credit or debit cards.
57
 
Businesses have also seized on SVCs as convenient and useful tools.  
Instead of issuing traditional payroll checks, some businesses issue prepaid 
cards to employees and simply load money onto the cards when payroll 
comes due.
58
  This type of SVC is especially useful for businesses in which 
employees are widely dispersed or constantly on the move, and use of 
SVCs for payroll purposes can result in lower payroll transaction costs for 
all types of employers.
59
  Other businesses issue promotions and rebates to 
their customers in the form of SVCs, and some insurance companies 
provide claim payments to policyholders on prepaid cards.
60
 
Government agencies also use SVCs, most frequently to issue benefit 




 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  The use of a pooled account rather than an account associated with a particular 
individual is the key difference between the operation of a prepaid card and a traditional 
debit card.  Id.  The ramifications of this distinction are discussed in greater detail in Part 
VI. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. NBPCA, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 49, at 2. 
 57. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., supra note 8. 
 58. NBPCA, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 49, at 2. 
 59. Albers, supra note 42, at 369-70. 
 60. NBPCA, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 49, at 2. 
 61. Id. 
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Prepaid cards have even been used for settlement payouts in government 
litigation, as with the $20 million settlement resulting from the Federal 
Trade Commission‘s 2007 lawsuit against pyramid-schemer SkyBiz.com.
62
  
Additional creative uses for SVCs by each of these groups will continue to 
emerge in the years to come. 
III. THE BASIC MECHANICS OF MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST 
FINANCING 
Money laundering can be defined as ―the criminal process of 
processing ill-gotten gains, or ‗dirty‘ money, through a series of 
transactions; in this way the funds are ‗cleaned‘ so that they appear to be 
proceeds from legal activities.‖
63
  While there are many different types of 
money laundering schemes,
64
 such schemes generally involve three distinct 
steps:  placement, layering, and integration.
65
  SVCs have the potential to 
play a key role in all three stages, though they are likely to be most useful 
in the placement and layering stages. 
Placement is the initial stage of money laundering.  The goal during 
the placement stage is to introduce the ―dirty‖ money into the legitimate 
financial system without attracting the attention of law enforcement 
personnel or the financial institutions where the transactions take place.
66
  
Because placement is the point in the money laundering process when 
illicit proceeds can most easily be traced to the underlying criminal 
activity, it is the stage in which the launderer is most vulnerable.  As such, 
placement often involves dividing large amounts of ill-gotten money into 
smaller sums, using these sums to purchase monetary instruments at one 
financial institution, and then depositing or cashing the instruments at a 
different financial institution.
67
  This type of activity, which is designed to 
circumvent the various reporting requirements at the targeted financial 
institutions, is commonly called ―structuring‖ because the transaction is 
structured to avoid detection.
68
  Because some types of SVCs can be 
anonymously purchased and reloaded,
69
 and because they provide an easy 
 
 62. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm‘n, Stored Value MasterCards Sent Today to 
SkyBiz Pyramid Scheme Victims (May 21, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/05/skybizredress.shtm. 
 63. FFIEC BSA/AML EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 26, at 7. 
 64. See generally NAT‘L MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 15-71 
(discussing various money laundering threats). 
 65. FFIEC BSA/AML EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 26, at 7-8. 
 66. Id. at 8. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at app. G (discussing structuring of money laundering). 
 69. NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR. REPORT, supra note 6, at 4. 
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initial access point to the U.S. financial system,
70
 prepaid cards have 
obvious appeal as a placement tool for money launderers. 
The second general stage in the money laundering process is layering.  
Launderers use layering to obscure the link between the underlying 
criminal activity and the money being laundered by moving the funds 
around the financial system, usually through a complex series of 
transactions.
71
  These transactions serve to complicate the paper trail and 
cause confusion for anyone attempting to trace the true origin of the 
money.
72
  Because of their portability, flexibility, and lack of regulation, 
prepaid cards are extremely useful for layering.  In addition to the fact that 
SVCs are extremely compact and physically easy to ship and transport, 
many types of prepaid cards can be used to approximate international wire 
transfers without the aid of a traditional bank or money transmitter.
73
   
Furthermore, because of the relatively weak AML regulations on SVCs,
74
 
the paper trails generated by transactions involving prepaid cards are 
inherently less robust than those generated by transactions involving more 
traditional monetary instruments.
75
  As one commentator observed, ―[a]n 
internal U.S. Treasury report notes that the September 11 hijackers were 
later identified by their bank accounts, card signatures, and wire transfers. 
‗Had the terrorists used prepaid cards to cover their expenses, none of these 
financial footprints would have been available,‘ the report said.‖
76
 
The final step in the money laundering process is integration.  The 
goal of integration is to provide a plausible explanation for the source of 
the funds.
77
  After the funds have been introduced into the financial system 
in the placement stage and insulated from the underlying criminal activity 
during the layering stage, additional transactions are completed to create 
the ―appearance of legality.‖
78
  Such additional transactions often involve 
the purchase and sale of real estate, securities, or other assets.
79
  Another 
method of integration involves moving the money through the accounts of 
a legitimate, cash-intensive business.  Certain money laundering schemes 
 
 70. NAT‘L MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 40. 
 71. FFIEC BSA/AML EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 26, at 8. 
 72. Id. 
 73. NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR. REPORT, supra note 6, at 4, 6-7. 
 74. Id. at 3-4. 
 75. See Chester Dawson, Prepaid Cards: Candy for Criminals?, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 
12, 2005, at 42, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_50/b3963115.htm (noting that prepaid 
card transactions fall outside the purview of federal statutes and consequently have not been 
subject to the types of institutional monitoring commonly applied to transactions involving 
traditional monetary instruments). 
 76. Id. 
 77. FFIEC BSA/AML EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 26, at 8. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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have utilized the large-scale sale or exchange of closed loop gift cards or 
phone cards as a tool for integration.
80
 
Unlike traditional money launderers, the goals of terrorist financiers 
are generally ideological rather than profit seeking.
81
  Nevertheless, the 
actual processes used by terrorist financiers are quite similar to those used 
by traditional money launderers.
82
  Instead of seeking to obscure the origins 
of illicit funds to protect their profits, terrorist financiers use similar 
methods to obscure their connections to terrorists or specific acts of 
terrorism.  Put another way, terrorist financing uses the same means as 
traditional money laundering to accomplish essentially converse ends:  
while traditional money launders seek to conceal the source of funds 
derived from illicit activity, terrorist financiers seek to conceal the source 
of funds used to finance illicit activity.
83
 
One key difference between traditional money laundering and terrorist 
financing is that funds involved in terrorist financing may come from 
legitimate sources, such as charitable donations.
84
  Thus, terrorist financing 
sometimes operates in the exact opposite direction of traditional money 
laundering:  instead of disguising criminal funds by financing legitimate 
activity, legitimate funds are disguised and used to finance criminal 
activity.  Regardless of the origin of the funds and the timing of the 
underlying criminal act in the process, the characteristics that make SVCs 
useful for traditional money launderers also make SVCs useful for terrorist 
financiers:  portability, flexibility, and anonymity.  As such, the remainder 
of this Comment will generally not differentiate between money laundering 
and terrorist financing. 
IV.  THE SPECIFIC MONEY LAUNDERING THREAT FROM VARIOUS TYPES 
OF SVCS 
According to the U.S. government, virtually all types of prepaid cards 
pose some kind of money laundering risk.
85
  The most obvious money 
laundering risks come from general-use open loop cards and specially 
designed remittance cards.
86
  These types of SVCs are not only compact 
and easily transportable, but they also serve as a potentially anonymous 
 
 80. NAT‘L MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 40. 
 81. FFIEC BSA/AML EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 26, at 8. 
 82. Id. 
 83.  See Id. at 9 (describing methods common to both traditional money laundering and 
terrorist financing). 
 84. Id. at 8. 
 85. See NAT‘L MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 42 (outlining potential 
threats from different types of SVCs).  The single exception is ―function-specific cards‖ 
(e.g., transit system cards), which pose no apparent potential threats.  Id. 
 86. Id. 
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way to circumvent barriers to the U.S. payment system and access ill-
gotten cash at ATMs all over the world.
87
  Because of their tremendous 
flexibility, general-use and remittance SVCs can be utilized in all three 
stages of money laundering, as well as in terrorist financing schemes. 
SVCs designed to facilitate payroll transactions, while extremely 
useful for legitimate businesses, also pose a significant money laundering 
and terrorist financing risk,
88
 particularly in the layering and integration 
phases of the money laundering process.  Specifically, money launderers 
can use payroll cards issued by fraudulent businesses to obscure the origin 
of ill-gotten funds or to fund terrorist operations from diverted legitimate 
funds.
89
  Given how easy it is to purchase an ―off the shelf company,‖
90
 the 
fraudulent use of payroll cards is clearly a legitimate concern. 
Multi-merchant gift cards also pose a money laundering risk.
91
  These 
cards, which may be open or closed loop, can only be used for purchases of 
goods and services (they cannot be used to access funds through ATMs).
92
  
An example of a closed loop multi-merchant gift card is a gift card that can 
be used at any store in a particular mall.
93
  Open loop multi-merchant gift 
cards are readily available through most major credit card companies and 
banks, and are generally accepted wherever the issuing company‘s credit 
and debit cards may be used.
94
  Both types of multi-merchant gift cards can 
be easily (and often anonymously) purchased in bulk and resold,
95
 thereby 
facilitating both the placement and layering stages of the money laundering 
process. 
Even closed loop single-merchant gift cards and prepaid phone cards 
can be used in money laundering schemes.
96
  These types of cards can be 
used in a number of different ways:  as an alternative form of currency in 
black markets, as a cash-intensive front business,
97
 or through a modified 
 
 87. Id. at 39. 
 88. Id. at 42. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See, e.g., Off the Shelf Companies / ready made companies - £54 plus VAT, 
FORMATIONS DIRECT, http://www.formationsdirect.com/Offtheshelfcompanies.aspx (last 
updated Jan. 7, 2011) (detailing process for ordering an ―off the shelf company‖). 
 91. NAT‘L MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 42. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See, e.g., Gift Cards, VALLEY WEST MALL, 
http://www.valleywestmall.com/information/gift_cards (last visited Jan. 6, 2011) (showing 
an example of a closed loop multi-merchant gift card). 
 94. See, e.g., Debit Cards: Chase Gift Cards, CHASE, 
https://www.chase.com/ccp/index.jsp?pg_name=ccpmapp/individuals/shared/page/gift_card 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2011) (showing an example of an open loop multi-merchant gift card). 
 95. NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 42. 
 96. Id. 
97. The sale of prepaid phone cards for use on cellular or long-distance networks is 
traditionally a cash-intensive business, making it an attractive integration mechanism for 
money launderers.  Id. at 40. 
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version of the Black Market Peso Exchange, a complex system in which 1) 
drug suppliers sell ill-gotten dollars to currency brokers in the U.S. in 
exchange for Colombian pesos, 2) the currency brokers use the dollars to 
buy goods in the U.S., and 3) the currency brokers sell the goods in 
Colombia in order to generate more pesos to sell to drug suppliers in the 
U.S.
98
  The money laundering threat associated with closed loop SVCs is 
well known in the law enforcement community, and FinCEN has been 
warning of money laundering risks associated with prepaid phone cards 
since at least 2001.
99
  Even the popular television series The Sopranos 
featured an episode involving an illicit prepaid phone card scheme.
100
 
Aware of these risks, a number of major SVC providers (including 
Visa and MasterCard) have attempted to establish voluntary AML 
programs related to SVCs, such as account limits and identity verification 
procedures.
101
  However, even the most mainstream general-use prepaid 
card providers often rely on third-party marketing companies to sell their 
products.
102
  This third-party involvement has the potential to complicate 
voluntary AML programs significantly, particularly with respect to identity 
verification.
103
  Furthermore, although many mainstream SVC providers 
have begun to limit the amount that can be placed on any one card, a 
simple Internet search reveals that anonymous, no-cap prepaid cards issued 
by offshore financial institutions are still readily available.
104
  Thus, it 
seems doubtful that voluntary guidelines represent a genuine solution to the 
money laundering threat posed by SVCs.
105
 
V. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT U.S. AML ENFORCEMENT 
REGIME AS IT RELATES TO SVCS 
Combating money laundering and terrorist financing is an important 
 
 98. Id. at 40, 42.  A detailed primer on the Black Market Peso Exchange can be found at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/advisory/pdf/advisu9.pdf. 
 99. Suspicious Activity Related to Phone Card Businesses, SAR BULL. (Fin. Crimes 
Enforcement Network, D.C.), June 2001, available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/rulings/pdf/sarbul6-01.pdf. 
 100. The Sopranos, Season 2-26:  Funhouse–Synopsis, HBO, http://www.hbo.com/the-
sopranos#/the-sopranos/episodes/2/26-funhouse/synopsis.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2011). 
 101. NAT‘L MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 41. 
 102. Albers, supra note 42, at 391-92. 
 103. See id. (noting potential difficulties in verifying customer information provided by 
nonbank marketing companies). 
 104. See, e.g., Bank Account Introduction with Prepaid Debit Card, THETABIZ 
OFFSHORE, https://www.offshore-services.biz/offshore-credit-card/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2011) 
(showing example of an anonymous no-cap prepaid card available from an offshore entity). 
 105. See NAT‘L MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 41 (noting that 
―[voluntary] guidance may not be consistently enforced‖). 
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priority of the U.S. government.
106
  This is evidenced in part by the severity 
of sanctions related to money laundering:  an individual convicted of 
money laundering can be sentenced to twenty years in prison and fined up 
to $500,000,
107
 and any property or assets traceable to the proceeds of 
criminal activity may be subject to forfeiture.
108
  The enforcement of these 
sanctions depends, however, on the ability of law enforcement officials to 
establish an evidentiary trail linking underlying criminal activity to 
particular funds.  Unfortunately, the existing AML laws and regulations do 
not adequately address the money laundering threat posed by SVCs, and 
the current regime does not give law enforcement personnel the tools they 
need to establish the necessary paper trail when prepaid cards are involved 
in a money laundering scheme. 
As noted in Part I, there are two major loopholes in the current AML 
regime as it relates to SVCs.  First, prepaid cards are not considered 
―monetary instruments‖ for purposes of the CMIR statute.
109
  This statute 
requires any person who transports monetary instruments with an aggregate 
value of over $10,000 into or out of the U.S. to report that they are doing 
so.
110
  This requirement is designed, in part, to prevent bulk cash 
smuggling, which is a crucial aspect of the placement stage of many money 
laundering schemes.
111
  Because large-scale international criminal 
enterprises such as sophisticated narcotics trafficking operations often 
generate massive amounts of small-denomination currency, physically 
moving that cash from the ―scene of the crime‖ to a location where it is 
accessible to the ultimate beneficiaries of the crime (often across 
international borders) is a key challenge for money launderers.
112
  Vehicles, 




As with many components of the U.S. AML regime, both the 
underlying conduct (here the cross-border smuggling of cash) and the 
failure to report that conduct (here the failure to file a CMIR report) are 
criminalized.
114
  If law enforcement personnel discover unreported 
monetary instruments with a total value of more than $10,000, such 
 
 106. NAT‘L MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 2, at iii. 
 107. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2006). 
 108. FFIEC BSA/AML EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 26, at 9. 
 109. NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR. REPORT, supra note 6, at 3. 
 110. 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (2006). 
 111. See NAT‘L MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 50-53 (discussing bulk 
cash smuggling). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c) (2006) (criminalizing CMIR reporting violations), 
with 31 U.S.C. § 5332 (2006) (criminalizing smuggling of monetary instruments). 
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instruments can be seized immediately.
115
  This provides an important 
incentive for legitimate transporters of bulk cash and other monetary 
instruments to file CMIR reports and gives law enforcement a powerful 
tool to interdict illicit smuggling. 
Unfortunately, law enforcement personnel have no recourse when it 
comes to individuals transporting SVCs, even when the aggregate value of 
the cards far exceeds $10,000.
116
  This is because the existing regulatory 
definition of ―monetary instruments‖ for purposes of the CMIR statute is, 
at present, insufficiently broad to include prepaid cards.
117
  As such, 
narcotics traffickers and other international criminals can legally move 
large quantities of what amounts to readily accessible cash across the U.S. 
border without filing CMIR reports, and law enforcement personnel lack 
the statutory authority to seize unreported prepaid cards.
118
 
To illustrate, a commentator asks his reader to imagine a hypothetical 
scenario in which the reader is a passenger on an international flight 
departing the U.S., and the passenger in the seat next to him opens a 
briefcase filled with stacks of high-denomination U.S. currency.
119
  Clearly, 
current law requires that this cash be reported, and U.S. law enforcement 
personnel could seize the cash if it were not reported.  The commentator 
then asks his reader to imagine that instead of cash, the briefcase is filled 
with neatly bound stacks of prepaid cards, the aggregate value of which 
could be many times greater than the currency in the first scenario.
120
  
Under current law, the passenger with the briefcase full of prepaid cards 
would have no obligation to file a CMIR report.  Thus, even if the case full 
of cards were discovered, law enforcement personnel would not have the 
statutory authority to seize the cards.  This is even more of a problem 
because SVCs, by their nature, are so much more portable than hard 
currency, and, for obvious reasons, it is far easier to conceal a $10,000 
prepaid card than it is to conceal $10,000 in cash.
121
 
The second major loophole in the current U.S. AML regime as it 
relates to SVCs is that providers of prepaid cards do not fall within the 
definition of a class of MSBs called ―money transmitters‖.
122
  As such, 
businesses that sell SVCs have no obligation to register with FinCEN, to 
verify or retain any customer information, or to file SARs.  Money services 
businesses that are presently classified as money transmitters, on the other 
 
 115. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2)(B) (2006) (authorizing seizure based on probable cause). 
 116. NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR. REPORT, supra note 6, at 3. 
 117. Linn, supra note 22, at 152. 
 118. NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR. REPORT, supra note 6, at 3. 
 119. Steve Cocheo, Prepaid Dilemma: Industry Balances Utility of Stored-Value Cards 
with Risk of Abuse, ABA BANKING J., Oct. 1, 2007, at 46. 
 120. Id. 
 121. NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR. REPORT, supra note 6, at 3. 
 122. Id. at 3-4. 
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hand, must satisfy all such requirements.
123
  Sellers of SVCs must still file 
CTRs for cash transactions involving more than $10,000 and maintain 
some sort of AML program,
124
 but these basic requirements are essentially 
toothless without regulatory oversight. 
Absent such oversight, law enforcement personnel tracking money 
launderers are left with significant gaps in the paper trail when SVCs are 
involved.  SARs have long been used to confirm hunches and build cases, 
and are increasingly being utilized to initiate investigations.
125
  
Furthermore, one of the reasons that SVCs are so appealing to money 
launderers is their potential for anonymity.
126
  Without a requirement for 
basic due diligence by purveyors of SVCs, prepaid cards will continue to 
be an ideal tool for money launderers and terrorist financiers. 
VI. COUNTERARGUMENTS AND RESPONSES 
Because both of the crucial definitions hindering aggressive AML 
enforcement related to SVCs—―monetary instrument‖ and ―money 
transmitter‖—are contained in the language of the regulations rather than in 
the enabling statutes, FinCEN could have acted to close both of these 
loopholes long ago.  So why has FinCEN failed to do so, at least so far?
127
  
Industry groups and commentators have raised a number of reasons for 
maintaining the status quo with respect to both the CMIR requirement and 
the definition of money transmitter.  The remainder of this Comment will 
examine and respond to each set of objections, and then conclude by 
arguing that notwithstanding these counterarguments, the money 
laundering threat posed by SVCs must be addressed by closing these 
loopholes. 
Critics argue that applying the CMIR requirement to SVCs is 
impractical for four main reasons.  First, critics argue that because the 
CMIR is more or less a voluntary requirement, it is unrealistic to expect 
money launderers to declare that they are carrying SVCs valued at over 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Elizabeth Donald & Dina M. Randazzo, Plugging the Gaps in the U.S. Anti-Money 
Laundering System, 6 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 10, 10 (2005). 
 126. NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR. REPORT, supra note 6, at 4. 
 127. FinCEN is currently exploring the possibility of including providers of SVCs in its 
definition of money transmitters.  Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations—
Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to Money Services Businesses, 74 Fed. Reg. 
22129 (proposed May 12, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103) [hereinafter FinCEN 
Proposed Rulemaking].  This proposed rule faces heavy resistance from the SVC industry.  
See, e.g., NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARD ASS‘N, RE: COMMENTS REGARDING STORED 
VALUE IN RESPONSE TO THE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING, RIN 1506–AA97 (2009) 
[hereinafter NBPCA, RESPONSE TO PROPOSED RULEMAKING] (opposing rule change). 
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$10,000.  While true to an extent, this criticism could apply equally to any 
monetary instrument covered by the CMIR regime, not just SVCs.  
Furthermore, because the CMIR enforcement scheme criminalizes both the 
act and the failure to report the act,
128
 including SVCs in the definition of 
monetary instruments covered by the CMIR would not only provide 
legitimate transporters of SVCs an incentive to file a report, but would also 
allow law enforcement personnel to seize unreported SVCs discovered in 
the course of the numerous searches that are regularly conducted at border 
crossings and in customs control areas throughout the U.S. 
Second, critics argue that CMIR requirements for SVCs are 
impractical because even if law enforcement personnel are able to discover 
unreported SVCs, many prepaid cards cannot be easily differentiated from 
traditional debit cards (for which no report is required).
129
  Indeed, most 
network-branded prepaid cards look virtually identical to debit cards, right 
down to the word ―Debit‖ displayed on the face of the prepaid card.
130
  To 
overcome this obstacle and prevent accidental seizures of traditional debit 
cards, law enforcement personnel will need some way to tell the difference 
between the two types of cards.  This distinction is important because debit 
cards are generally linked to individual accounts, while prepaid cards are 
linked to pooled accounts.  Because they are linked to individual accounts, 
debit cards are far less transferrable than SVCs, are subject to much greater 
regulation, and generally do not raise the same money laundering concerns 
raised by SVCs.  Furthermore, the seizure of debit cards raises certain 
privacy issues that are not applicable to SVCs.
131
 
One potential solution would be to require SVC issuers to include a 
label or emblem on the face of the card identifying the card as prepaid.
132
  
While card issuers might object that any mark intended to draw law 
enforcement scrutiny to SVCs may make the cards less appealing to 
potential customers,
133
 there is no reason the identifying mark would need 
to be large or obvious, and this concern seems mostly theoretical. 
Even if law enforcement personnel could easily differentiate between 
SVCs and traditional debit cards, a third practical obstacle to subjecting 
SVCs to the CMIR requirements is how to determine the value of a given 
prepaid card in order to confirm that a suspect is illegally transporting cards 
with an aggregate value of more than $10,000.  Some have suggested 
establishing a special phone number for law enforcement personnel to call 
 
 128. See supra note 114 (criminalizing CMIR reporting violations and the smuggling of 
monetary instruments). 
 129. Linn, supra note 22, at 156-57. 
 130. Id. at 157. 
 131. These issues will be discussed in more detail infra. 
 132. Linn, supra note 22, at 157. 
 133. Id. 
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 but it would likely be more efficient for law enforcement 
personnel—and more cost effective for SVC providers—to equip relevant 
law enforcement personnel with portable card readers similar to those used 
by merchants at the point of sale.
135
  Procuring and distributing card readers 
to relevant law enforcement personnel and training them on use of the 
readers would pose a logistical challenge for law enforcement agencies, but 
presumably not an insurmountable one. 
The card readers could be phased in gradually, beginning with high-
traffic border crossings and airports, and then eventually spreading to 
additional locations.  Another benefit of introducing card readers is that 
their use might eventually obviate the need for identifying marks on SVCs:  
the card reader could be programmed to initially query the type of card, and 
then the reader would query the available balance only if the first reply 
signaled that the card was prepaid rather than a traditional debit card.
136
 
The fourth and final practical obstacle to applying the CMIR 
regulations to SVCs is how to actually ―seize‖ the funds associated with a 
prepaid card.
137
  Simply taking physical possession of a card may not result 
in an effective seizure because there may be other cards that can access the 
same stored value.
138
  In light of this, any card reader used by law 
enforcement personnel should also be able to initiate a debit of the attached 
funds, through a process similar to that used in standard merchant 
transactions (as described in Part II).
139
  The funds could then be deposited 




Thus, the use of slightly modified existing technology could 
reasonably overcome the main practical objections to including SVCs in 
the definition of monetary instruments.  However, there are also potential 
constitutional and privacy concerns that must be addressed.  Most 
importantly, it must be determined whether the swiping of an SVC by a law 
enforcement officer to determine the card‘s balance constitutes a ―search‖ 
under the Fourth Amendment,
141
 and, if so, whether this search can be 
 
 134. Id. (discussing suggestion by NBPCA to utilize a 1-800 number for this purpose). 
 135. NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR. REPORT, supra note 6, at 8; see also Linn, supra 
note 22, at 157 (suggesting use of ―point of sale-type device‖ by law enforcement 
personnel). 
 136. See Linn, supra note 22, at 157 (describing the potential process for government-
generated queries of SVCs). 
 137. Id. 
 138. See NAT‘L MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 40 (noting that some 
providers allow multiple prepaid cards to be issued for the same account). 
 139. Linn, supra note 22, at 157. 
 140. Id. 
 141. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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conducted without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
142
 
At first glance, swiping a prepaid card to determine its value seems 
similar to searching an electronic storage device (such as a computer‘s hard 
drive), which federal courts have generally held to be a search for purposes 
of the Fourth Amendment.
143
  However, a strong argument can be made 
that swiping a prepaid card to determine its value is less like searching a 
computer hard drive and more ―akin to a police officer initiating a check on 
a vehicle identification number or even a license plate,‖ which federal 




Of course, vehicle identification numbers and license plates are, by 
design, in plain view.
145
  Presumably, the stored value associated with a 
prepaid card is not.  However, even assuming that swiping an SVC to 
determine its value is a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, such 
a search likely can nevertheless be conducted without probable cause or 
even reasonable suspicion.  As one commentator explained, ―[u]nder what 
is termed the ‗border search‘ exception, routine searches of persons and the 
effects of entrants into the USA are not subject to any requirement of 
reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant.‖
146
 
This exception extends to virtually all property, including closed 
containers such as luggage, briefcases, wallets, purses, and the photos and 
papers found therein.
147
  Notably, even searches of laptop computers and 
other electronic devices can be conducted without suspicion under the 
border search exception.
148
  While the Supreme Court has indicated that 
there are some limits to the border search exception, the Court has upheld 
the government‘s right to completely disassemble and reassemble a car‘s 
fuel tank at a border crossing without suspicion.
149
  Clearly, swiping a 
 
 142. See generally Linn, supra note 22, at 158-60 (discussing 4th Amendment issues 
related to the extension of the CMIR requirement to prepaid cards). 
 143. See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 
549 n.79 (collecting cases). 
 144. Linn, supra note 22, at 159. 
    145.   For an object to fall within the plain view exception, the government must satisfy a 
three-prong test:  1) the officer must ―be lawfully located in a place from which the object 
can be plainly seen,‖ 2) the officer must ―have a lawful right of access to the object itself,‖ 
and 3) the object's ―incriminating character must also be ‗immediately apparent‘‖ to the 
officer.  Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136, 137 (1990) (internal citation omitted). 
 146. Id. at 160. 
 147. See United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008) (―Courts have 
long held that searches of closed containers and their contents can be conducted at the 
border without particularized suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.‖); see also Linn, 
supra note 22, at 160 (collecting cases). 
 148. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008. (―[W]e are satisfied that reasonable suspicion is not 
needed for customs officials to search a laptop or other personal electronic storage devices 
at the border.‖). 
 149. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152, 155 (2004). 
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prepaid card to determine its value is far less intrusive than dismantling a 
vehicle‘s fuel tank, so it follows that a swipe of an SVC absent suspicion 




Another potential legal issue arising from more aggressive AML 
regulation of SVCs is whether swiping a prepaid card to determine its value 
would violate provisions of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 
(―RFPA‖),
151
 which prohibits financial institutions from giving the 
government access to information in the financial records of any customer 
without a warrant, subpoena, court order, or customer authorization.
152
  
However, as one commentator has pointed out, the definition of ―customer‖ 
in the RFPA is limited to a person who has ―utilized . . . any service of a 
financial institution . . . in relation to an account maintained in the person‘s 
name.‖
153
  Because the funds attached to SVCs are generally held in pooled 
rather than individual accounts, most prepaid cardholders are not 
―customers‖ for purposes of the RFPA, even though they clearly utilize the 
services of financial institutions.
154
  As such, neither constitutional nor 
privacy concerns should derail a fix of the CMIR loophole as it relates to 
SVCs. 
Turning to the issue of classifying sellers of SVCs as money 
transmitters, the objections are primarily practical.  Most importantly, 
opponents of imposing FinCEN registration and other reporting 
requirements on SVC sellers argue that these requirements would place an 
undue burden on SVC vendors and would ultimately deter them from 
selling SVCs.  This, in turn, would negatively impact unbanked customers 
by denying them access to the global payments system.
155
  This is certainly 
a valid concern, particularly because many entities that currently sell 
prepaid cards are small, unsophisticated, and cater to markets that are 
underserved by more traditional financial institutions.  As one commentator 
noted, ―[u]nlike a deposit or withdrawal at a traditional bank, the cards can 
generally be purchased anonymously at travel offices, money-service 
 
 150. See Linn, supra note 22, at 160 (explaining that: 
A search of a prepaid card is less invasive than a fuel tank search.  Not only 
does a fuel tank search take a significantly longer amount of time, but it 
involves physically probing a vehicle possessed or owned by the traveler.  
Swiping a prepaid card to ascertain the value of the funds associated with the 
card is minimally invasive, takes only a few moments, and ultimately intrudes 
upon information owned and possessed by a third party, not the traveler.). 
 151. Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (Nov. 10, 1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-
3420, 3422 (2006)). 
 152. 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (2006). 
 153. Linn, supra note 22, at 161 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 3401(a)(5) (2006)). 
 154. Id. 
 155. NBPCA, RESPONSE TO PROPOSED RULEMAKING, supra note 127. 
LEINOFINALIZED_SEVEN 1/8/2011  12:01 AM 
320 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 13:1 
 
centers or convenience stores, over the telephone or on the Internet.‖
156
  
This would ―bring a whole new set of companies under the authority of 
financial regulators . . . the ramifications of [which] could be complex.‖
157
 
It is worth noting in response, however, that some individual states 
already classify SVC vendors as money transmitters.
158
  While compliance 
with federal regulations would likely be more burdensome than that 
required by existing state laws, classifying SVC purveyors in this manner is 
clearly not a novel concept.  Furthermore, the predicted expansion of the 
prepaid market
159
 will likely serve to mitigate the increased costs of 
compliance:  while margins may decrease under more intensive regulation, 
rapid expansion of demand should more than make up for lost profits.  
More importantly, in light of the huge risks associated with a failure to 
regulate—including the possibility of a catastrophic terrorist attack akin to 
September 11—increased compliance costs are surely justified.  At the end 
of the day, this burden may simply be one that ―this financial community 




The Credit CARD Act of 2009 was signed into law on May 22, 2009.  
As such, the Secretary of the Treasury, FinCEN, and the other financial 
regulators have apparently already missed their deadline to close the 
loopholes related to stored value cards within the 270-day timeframe set 
forth in the Act.
161
  If the regulators fail to make the necessary changes 
when they issue revised regulations in the future, Congress should 
intervene and directly amend the language of the United States Code, as the 
original S.A. 1107 would have done.  In order to fulfill the central purpose 
of the Bank Secrecy Act and ―safeguard the U.S. financial system from the 
abuses of financial crime, including money laundering, terrorist financing, 
and other illicit financial transactions,‖
162
 Congress may have no real 
choice but to amend the amended amendment once again. 
 
 156. Phil Mattingly, Card Traffic Flying Under Regulatory Radar, CQ WEEKLY, May 
25, 2008, at *2, available at 2008 WLNR 10362464. 
 157. Albers, supra note 42, at 393-94. 
 158. FinCEN Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 127. 
   159.   See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (discussing expected growth of prepaid 
market). 
 160. Donald & Randazzo, supra note 125, at 10. 
 161. Two-hundred seventy days after May 22, 2009 was February 16, 2010. 
 162. FFIEC BSA/AML EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 26, at 7. 
